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[Insert Company Name] Sucks: A
Response to Speech, Citizenry and the
Market
Byron Crowe II

*

In his article “Speech, Citizenry, and the Market: A
Corporate Public Figure Doctrine,” Professor Deven Desai
argues that corporations have a privileged amount of control
over speech about them. As a result, he says that the Supreme
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence requires the law to
recognize a corporate public figure doctrine that applies in
1
trademark infringement and dilution actions. Doing so,
according to Desai, would “ensure that speech rights are
properly balanced” while collapsing the supposedly
unnecessary legal distinction between commercial and political
2
speech.
Professor Desai is correct that corporations today are able
and willing to have a powerful impact on public dialogue
regarding both commercial and political matters. In this sense,
corporations often play a role that is analogous to a public
figure. However, his analysis leading up to his conclusion falls
short for several reasons. This essay responds to Desai’s article,
focusing on his analysis of infringement and dilution suits. Part
I argues that corporations do not have a privileged amount of
control over speech about them because trademark
infringement and dilution actions do not place any meaningful
limits on peoples’ ability to critique corporations. Part II argues
that, even if corporations did enjoy a privileged amount of
control over speech about them, the Supreme Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence does not require the adoption of a
corporate public figure doctrine. Part III presents a conclusion.

* Byron Crowe is a corporate associate at Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale
and Dorr LLP in Boston. He holds a J.D. from Cornell Law School and a B.A.
in economics from Tufts University.
1. Deven R. Desai, Speech, Citizenry, and the Market: A Corporate Public
Figure Doctrine, 98 MINN. L. REV. 455, 457–59, 501 (2013).
2. Id. at 457.
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I. CORPORATIONS DO NOT HAVE A PRIVILEGED
AMOUNT OF CONTROL
Professor Desai’s first premise is that corporations have a
privileged amount of control over speech about them relative to
natural persons. According to Desai, in light of the rights
3
granted to corporations in Citizens United, “an imbalance in
4
has emerged that “provide[s]
corporate speech law”
5
corporations with a speech advantage” over individuals. Thus,
“[i]f corporations are afforded the same speech rights as and
against individuals . . . , individuals should have the same
6
rights against corporations.”
Desai’s argument is problematic because individuals and
corporations do have the same speech rights as and against
each other. As he notes, Citizens United provided corporations
with essentially the same First Amendment speech rights as
7
natural persons. However, trademark law and defamation law
do not make a distinction between corporations and individuals
for the purpose of bringing suits. Both natural persons and
8
corporations can own and enforce trademarks as well as
9
initiate defamation suits.
This symmetry also extends to defending speech suits. In
defending a defamation suit, natural persons and corporations
can invoke the public figure doctrine, which requires the
plaintiff to make a showing of actual malice where the plaintiff
10
is a public figure. While the Supreme Court has not officially

3. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
4. See Desai, supra note 1 at 479.
5. Id. at 480.
6. Id. at 495.
7. Id. at 459; see Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 343 (“The Court has thus
rejected the argument that political speech of corporations . . . should be
treated differently under the First Amendment simply because such
associations are not ‘natural persons.’”) (citation omitted).
8. See, e.g., Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc.,
638 F.3d 1137, 1143 (9th Cir. 2011) (involving a corporate plaintiff suing a
corporate defendant for trademark infringement); Lamparello v. Falwell, 420
F.3d 309, 311 (4th Cir. 2005) (involving individual plaintiff suing an individual
defendant for trademark infringement).
9. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (involving an
individual plaintiff suing a corporation for libel); VECC, Inc. v. Bank of Nova
Scotia, 296 F. Supp. 2d 617, 621 (D.V.I. 2003) (involving a corporate plaintiff
suing a corporate defendant for defamation).
10. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342 (“Those who . . . are . . . public figures and
those who hold governmental office may recover for injury to reputation only
on clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was made with
knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth.”); D. Mark
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recognized the status of corporate plaintiffs for the purposes of
11
the doctrine, the lower courts have widely held that corporate
12
plaintiffs can be public figures in defamation suits. In suits for
trademark infringement or dilution, the courts uniformly do
not apply the public figure doctrine whether the plaintiff is a
natural person or a corporation.
Moreover, individuals enjoy certain speech-related rights
that corporations do not. The right of publicity, for example,
which is the state-law based “right of every human being to
13
control the commercial use of his or her identity,” gives
individuals but not corporations a cause of action for
14
misappropriation of their identity or persona. This right,
15
gives individuals
which the Supreme Court has validated,
additional control over speech about them beyond trademark
and defamation law. Likewise, the right against being placed in
16
a false light, which is recognized in about two-thirds of states,
17
protects human plaintiffs but not business entities.
Considering these exclusively individual rights, Desai’s
statement that “a nationally famous corporate person is treated
18
differently than its natural-person counterpart” is only true
in the opposite manner of what he intended.

Jackson, The Corporate Defamation Plaintiff in the Era of SLAPPs: Revisiting
New York Times v. Sullivan, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 491, 497–99 (2001).
11. See Jackson, supra note 10, at 502 (“the Supreme Court has yet to
establish the status of corporate defamation plaintiffs.”). But see Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
12. See, e.g., Steaks Unlimited, Inc., v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264 (3d Cir.
1980) (holding that the corporate plaintiff was a public figure because it
“injected itself into a matter of public interest” through a four-day meat sale
with a large amount of advertising); Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe
Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 589 (1st Cir. 1980) (recognizing that
corporations can be public figures); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star
Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947, 957 (D.D.C. 1976) (holding that corporate
defense contractor was a public figure). See generally Jackson, supra note 10,
at 503–08.
13. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2d
ed).
14. See THOMAS PHILLIP BOGGESS V, 31 CAUSES OF ACTION § 5 (West
2013).
15. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 577 (1977).
16. Getting It Right, But in a “False Light,” REPORTER’S COMMITTEE FOR
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/
digital-journalists-legal-guide/getting-it-right-false-light-0 (last visited Aug. 5,
2014).
17. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY §
4:41 (2d ed).
18. Desai, supra note 1, at 458.
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Speech protected by First Yes
Amendment?
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trademarks?
Can initiate a defamation Yes
action?
Courts
have
applied Yes
public figure doctrine to
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suits?
Courts
have
applied No
public figure doctrine to
plaintiffs in trademark
infringement and dilution
suits?
Rights of publicity and Yes
privacy (false light)?
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Corporations
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No

No

Symmetry, however, is not Desai’s primary concern. The
problem, he says, is that the current regime of corporate
19
reputational laws, “limits [everyone’s] ability to critique a
20
corporate public figure.” Desai supports this assertion by
pointing to actions for trademark infringement and dilution
under the Lanham Act. Because corporations are aggressive
enforcers of trademarks, he says infringement and dilution
actions “hinder [everyone’s] ability to use speech to question
21
Unfortunately,
Desai’s
and
police
corporations.”
characterization of U.S. trademark law is incomplete.
A. FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION
As Desai notes, federal dilution law protects famous marks
from burring or tarnishment and allows corporations to sue
22
even where there is no risk of confusion, so long as there has
23
been actual dilution of the holder’s trademark. Dilution
actions also do not inquire into whether the information
19. Desai mentions defamation as being included in this group of
“corporate reputation laws.” Id. at 457. However, his analysis focuses on
trademark infringement and dilution.
20. Id. at 475.
21. Id. at 482.
22. See id. at 483; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012).
23. See Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
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24

conveyed was false. As a result, Desai claims that “[d]ilution
law fails to accommodate the criticism that should be possible
25
for a public figure.”
However, Desai’s claim ignores the federal dilution
exemptions. These statutory provisions explicitly protect
criticizing, parodying, and commenting on famous marks, on
26
The
their owners, or on their owners’ goods or services.
exemptions also include news commentary and any other non27
commercial use of a mark. Thus, it is unclear how federal
dilution law keeps an individual from criticizing a corporation
or its products.
This inconsistency does not stop Desai. He states that,
despite their current breadth, “the exemptions simply do not
28
cover what they should.” What should they cover? Desai tells
us that the exemptions should focus on “the criticism and
29
commentary inquiries needed for speech about public figures.”
This is an unsatisfactory explanation for two reasons. First, as
abovementioned, the exemptions already include criticism and
commentary. Second, even if they did not, Desai’s reasoning is
circular: he argues that the inadequacy of dilution exemptions
is why the law must recognize a corporate public figure
doctrine but uses the absence of the doctrine as the reason the
dilution exemptions are inadequate.
Lastly, Desai critiques the dilution exemptions for being
ambiguous, which he says “put[s] us in a world of late case
30
resolution and uncertainty about liability.” However, in the
context of critical speech about corporations, his concern over
the statute’s ambiguity is completely unfounded: “parodying,
criticizing, or commenting” unquestionably includes the type of
speech Desai is concerned about. Indeed, under the current
framework, individuals are free to compare large corporations
31
to Nazis and terrorists and even make a profit from doing so.
Moreover, it is unlikely that the alternative, a corporate
public figure doctrine, would be much better. Under Desai’s
24. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
25. Desai, supra note 1, at 484.
26. See 5 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2012). It is worth noting that while Desai
recognizes some of the exemptions, he conveniently omits criticism in his
above-the-line analysis. See Desai, supra note 1, at 484.
27. See 5 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3).
28. Desai, supra note 1, at 484.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 485.
31. See, e.g., Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (N.D.
Ga. 2008).
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proposal, public figure corporations would be required to prove
actual malice for dilution actions. Actual malice, in turn, would
require the plaintiff to show that the statement including the
mark was false and that it was made with knowledge of its
32
falsity or with reckless disregard for the statement’s truth.
While this higher standard would mean summary judgment
could be a more effective tool for defending dilution suits,
actual malice is still a highly-factual inquiry and the additional
step of determining which corporations are public figures could
complicate litigation, meaning less certainty at the outset.
B. FEDERAL TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
After exhausting his dilution analysis, Desai moves on to
the Lanham Act’s provisions on trademark infringement. Here,
he critiques the current infringement framework because it
33
allows the object of speech to control the speech’s content.
According to Desai, current trademark law is flawed because
34
“[m]ark holders, not consumers, bring trademark suits” and
because mark holders can use cease-and-desist letters and
35
strike suits to chill speech. However, this would still be
possible under his proposed arrangement. Even if a corporate
public figure doctrine applied to the Lanham Act, consumers
would still be unable to bring infringement suits and
trademark owners would still be able to send cease-and-desist
letters and bring meritless infringement suits.
Moreover, the fact that trademark holders can bring
lawsuits under the current regime does not mean that they are
successful. As Desai notes, a successful claim for infringement
requires at the very least a showing that the use of the mark is
“likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as
to the affiliation, connection, or association” between the
36
plaintiff and defendant or their products. This test is factintensive, has multiple factors, and is rarely amenable to
37
summary judgment. However, just because the test is factdriven does not mean it does not protect the types of speech
Desai is concerned with. Indeed, it is hard to see how any fact
32. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342, (1974).
33. Desai, supra note 1, at 486.
34. Id. at 485.
35. Id. at 486.
36. Id.; 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)(1)(A) (2012).
37. See Desai, supra note 1, at 486. However, in cases involving unrelated
goods, for example, the analysis can be much simpler: “If the goods are totally
unrelated, there can be no infringement because confusion is unlikely.” See
AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979).
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finder could be confused about the association of the plaintiff
and defendant where the defendant is criticizing a corporation
or its products.
Of course, the fact-intensive nature of the confusion
analysis under the current regime means defendants must
incur great costs to defend meritless suits. However, these costs
are also borne by plaintiffs, and corporations may be unwilling
to bear these additional costs where an infringement suit is
38
meritless. This along with the possibility of sanctions and
39
disciplinary action for attorneys who bring meritless claims
reduces the risk of meritless suits under the current
infringement and dilution frameworks.
C. DILUTION AND INFRINGEMENT: THE COMMERCIAL USE
REQUIREMENT
Desai’s worry that the Lanham Act is being used to silence
corporate critics is also problematic for a more fundamental
reason: actions under the Lanham Act for infringement or
40
dilution must be predicated on a “commercial use” of a mark.
The Lanham Act does not prohibit a noncommercial use of
41
another’s trademark, and courts have generally construed
what constitutes commercial use in a narrow manner.
What is a commercial use? For the purposes of trademark
42
43
44
infringement, the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, as well
45
as the District Court for District of Columbia, have all

38. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
39. See American Bar Association Model Rule 3.1.
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) & (c).
41. R. Kent Warren, Interpreting Commercial Speech under the Lanham
Act’s Commercial Use Requirement: Tension Between Online Trademark and
First Amendment Free Speech Rights, 4 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 342, 343 (2006).
42. See Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 775 (6th Cir. 2003) (“As
long as [the defendant] has no commercial links on either of his websites . . .
we find no use ‘in connection with the advertising’ of goods and services to
enjoin, and the Lanham Act cannot be properly invoked.”).
43. See Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 678 (9th Cir.
2005) (finding no commercial use where defendant created website to expose
negative information about plaintiff’s services on the internet).
44. See Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. &
Research, 527 F.3d 1045, 1052 (10th Cir. 2008) (upholding district court’s
finding that defendant’s use was not a commercial because it “provided no
goods or services, earned no revenue, and had no direct links to any
commercial sites.”).
45. See Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 934 (D.D.C.
1985) (“Defendants' only activity is trying to communicate their ideas.
Purveying points of view is not a service. Even if promoting of ideas was
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concluded that there is no commercial use unless a trademark
was used for some type of commercial gain, like the sale of
products or services. The First Circuit has also suggested it
46
would follow this reasoning. Only a minority of federal courts
have adopted a more expansive boundary for the commercial
47
use requirement in infringement suits. And even in these
courts, plaintiffs still must show that the mark was either used
48
in connection with the provision of a product or service or used
49
to harm the plaintiff commercially.
Showing commercial use is even more difficult for dilution
actions. Congress explicitly included an exemption for “[a]ny
50
noncommercial use of a mark.” Thus, “courts applying the
exception have held that all speech which is not purely
51
commercial . . . is subject to the exception.”
Through its infringement and dilution provisions, the only
type of speech that the Lanham Act prohibits about a
corporation is speech that uses the corporation’s trademark (or
a similar one) and that is commercial in nature. When this
requirement is combined with infringement’s confusion
requirement and dilution’s statutory exemptions, it is hard to
see how the broader public is being kept from criticizing
corporations. This is especially true where the critical speech is
52
artistic. Indeed, in most of the cases that Desai cites, the
considered to be conducting an educational ‘service,’ television messages that
are only used to express those ideas do not sell or advertise them.”).
46. See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO v.
Winship Green Nursing Ctr., 103 F.3d 196, 207 (1st Cir. 1996).
47. See Jews For Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 308 (D.N.J. 1998)
aff'd, 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that defendants use constituted a
commercial use of the mark because it was to harm the plaintiff
commercially); People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263
F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiff only needed to show that
defendants use prevented users from obtaining or using defendant’s goods or
services); see also United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. New
York, Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1997).
48. See id.
49. See Jews For Jesus, 993 F. Supp. at 308; Doughney, 263 F.3d at 365.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (2012).
51. Griffith v. Fenrick, 486 F. Supp. 2d 848, 853 (W.D. Wis. 2007); see also
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating in
its analysis of a dilution action that “[i]f speech is not ‘purely commercial’—
that is, if it does more than propose a commercial transaction—then it is
entitled to full First Amendment protection.”); TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d
433, 437 (5th Cir. 2004).
52. See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902; Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1000
(2d Cir. 1989) (“[Our] construction of the Lanham Act accommodates consumer
and artistic interests. It insulates from restriction titles with at least minimal
artistic relevance that are ambiguous or only implicitly misleading but leaves
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53

defendants prevailed. He gives few cases where a defendant’s
criticism of a corporation was successfully enjoined under the
54
current trademark regime. And even in those cases where the
plaintiff was successful, the speech in question was decidedly
55
commercial.
D. THE SUPPOSEDLY BLURRED LINE BETWEEN COMMERCIAL
AND POLITICAL SPEECH
Desai, however, argues that the commercial use
requirement is inadequate to protect speech because “the
distinction between commercial and political [speech] has
collapsed so much that the need to ensure a high flow of
information about corporations and their goods and services is
56
great, regardless of the label on such information.” In support
of this, he cites examples of corporations taking stances on
57
political issues as well as the influence of consumers’ political
58
persuasions on their purchasing decisions.
As an example of the latter, Desai points to Nike Inc. v.
59
Kasky. In that case, Nike launched a campaign to protect its
vulnerable to claims of deception titles that are explicitly misleading as to
source or content, or that have no artistic relevance at all.”).
53. See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d
252, 269 (4th Cir. 2007); Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d
792, 807 (9th Cir. 2003); Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902.
54. See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994);
Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Hyundai Motor Am., 10 CIV. 1611 PKC, 2012
WL 1022247 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2012); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc.,
346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
55. Of course, that is not to say that none of the cases support his premise
that corporations can quash criticism about their brand. One case that is
particularly concerning is Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d
Cir. 1994). In Deere, the Second Circuit enjoined an advertisement that
depicted a modified version of John Deere’s trademark running away from the
competitor’s lawn tractor and a barking dog. Id. at 45. This case is
disconcerting from a First Amendment perspective because the defendant’s
dilutive use was both comparative in nature and critical of John Deere.
However, even here, the defendant was a corporation whose primary motive
for running the advertisement was profit, not public dialogue. Moreover, the
Deere case is likely the low-water mark for commercial speech protection since
it appears to be the first case ever to hold a defendant liable for making goodhumored and non-confusing fun of a competitor’s logo. See Mary LaFrance,
Steam Shovels and Lipstick: Trademarks, Greed, and the Public Domain, 6
NEVADA L.J. 447, 468 (2006).
56. Desai, supra note 1, at 467.
57. Id. at 487, 506 (noting Chick-fil-A, Google, Nabisco, and J.C. Penney’s
stance on gay rights).
58. See id. at 472–74.
59. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (2002); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini
Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972),
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image in response to allegations that the company engaged in
60
unethical labor practices abroad. Kasky, a private citizen,
then sued Nike under California law, alleging that Nike had
made false and misleading statements about its labor practices
61
during its campaign. Because Nike’s speech was motivated by
commercial concerns, Desai states that it was “simultaneously
62
commercial speech and political speech.”
However, this example—along with the rest that Desai
63
explores —only establishes that corporations and people are
increasingly considering politics in their economic decision
making. It does not support the proposition that commercial
information is playing a greater role in people’s political
decision making and thus deserves greater First Amendment
protection. That is, while a consumer may take into account a
company’s politics in deciding to buy a product, Desai gives us
no examples—hypothetical or otherwise—where a corporation’s
reputation now has an impact on an individual’s political
choices. Unless and until this is shown, the current
framework’s requirement of a commercial use for dilution and
infringement actions provides sufficient protection for speech
about corporations.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE DOES NOT
REQUIRE A CORPORATE PUBLIC FIGURE DOCTRINE
Professor Desai’s argument is also flawed because it
mischaracterizes how to apply the Supreme Court’s First
Amendment jurisprudence. Desai argues that corporate speech
is privileged and that commercial speech today has greater
political significance. However, even if both these statements
were true, it would not follow that “the logic of the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence regarding corporate speech and public
figures requires that the law recognize a corporate public figure
64
doctrine” for trademark and dilution actions.
Desai is correct in his assertion that the Supreme Court’s
65
First Amendment cases prefer more speech, even where the
60. Desai, supra note 1, at 487.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 488.
63. See supra notes 57 & 58.
64. See Desai, supra note 1, at 459.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2545 (2012) (“The
requirements of a knowing falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth as the
condition for recovery in certain defamation cases exists to allow more speech,
not less.”).
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content of that speech is factually incorrect. The Court’s prior
cases have preferred counter-speech as the appropriate means
of correcting a false claim as opposed to banning the initial
66
false statement. As the Court said in Sullivan, “erroneous
statement[s] are inevitable in free debate, and [they] must be
protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the
67
‘breathing space’ that they ‘need to survive.’” Through the
“marketplace of ideas,” false statements will tend to be
68
discredited. As a result, the Court’s First Amendment
jurisprudence has a high tolerance for incorrect political
speech.
Also, while commercial speech receives a lower amount of
69
First Amendment protection, the Court has explicitly stated
70
that commercial speech is not stripped of all protection. Why?
As the Court has recognized, commercial speech still adds
71
value to the marketplace of ideas. With this in mind, Desai’s
reasoning seems intuitive: If (A) commercial speech now has a
political impact, (B) the Court’s jurisprudence tolerates false
speech that has a political impact and (C) trademark and
dilution actions do nothing more than censor false commercial
statements, then (D) the Court’s reasoning should require
actual malice for some infringement and dilution actions, like it
does in defamation cases.
However, even if premises (A) and (B) were correct,
premise (C) is not. Trademark infringement and dilution
actions do not concern themselves with the truthfulness of the
speech in question. Neither action requires the defendant’s
72
statements to be untrue. Rather, infringement and dilution
are meant to protect the identity of the speaker. By contrast, the
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence has not primarily
66. See Desai, supra note 1, at 508.
67. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72, (1964).
68. See Gregory Brazeal, How Much Does a Belief Cost?: Revisiting the
Marketplace of Ideas, 21 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1, 3 (2011).
69. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 (2012); Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980)
(“The Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial speech
than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.”).
70. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976).
71. See id.; Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975) (“The
relationship of speech to the marketplace of products or of services does not
make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas.”).
72. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2012) & § 1125 (2012). Of course, an action for
false advertising does require an untrue statement. However, that is outside
the scope of this essay, which focuses on infringement and dilution.
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concerned itself with the identity of the speaker. Instead, it has
focused on the content of the speech. This makes trademark
and dilution distinguishable from the Court’s previous
reasoning on false speech. While the Court tolerates false
speech because the marketplace of ideas can sort it out, the
marketplace itself may rely on the integrity of the sources of
information. That is, if the speech of sources who have a
reputation for truth and quality is valued more than others,
protecting the identity of the speakers (and the trademarks by
which they identify themselves) may be necessary for the
marketplace to work. If consumers cannot identify the sources
of the products and information in the market, they will be
unable to distinguish trustworthy products and information
from the rest.
CONCLUSION
Despite its shortcomings, Desai’s analysis brings up a
number of important issues in the current legal framework. For
example, the power and prominence of corporations in today’s
society means they do sometimes play a role analogous to
public figures. Thus, as other scholars have argued, it may be
appropriate to treat some types of corporate plaintiffs as per se
73
public figures in the context of defamation suits.
Also, while the current framework generally does not give
corporations a privileged amount of control over speech about
them, there are some jurisdictions where the courts have
arguably not done enough to protect speech. For example, the
Third and Fourth Circuits have adopted a broad understanding
of what constitutes a commercial use for the purposes of
74
infringement suits. These courts only require a showing that
75
the defendant’s use will harm the plaintiff commercially. This
broad definition of commercial use likely chills noncommercial
speech while severely chaffing the First Amendment.
Lastly, as Desai notes, the dilution exemptions of the
Lanham Act do not apply to state actions for dilution. While
twelve states along with the District of Columbia and Puerto
76
Rico do not have dilution statutes, the statutes of the
73. See Jackson, supra note 10, at 492. I do not weigh in on the wisdom of
doing so.
74. See Jews For Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 308 (D.N.J. 1998)
aff'd, 159 F.3d 1351 (3d Cir. 1998); People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2001).
75. See id.
76. Patrick Bickley, Almost Famous: Finding a Role for State Dilution
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remaining states generally do not include explicit exemptions
77
like those of the Lanham Act. In these states, defendants
must affirmatively raise a defense under the First Amendment.
As Professor Mary LaFrance has noted, judicial responses to
78
these First Amendment arguments have been inconsistent.
This has resulted in concerning cases like Deere, which was
79
brought under a state dilution statute. Moreover, the trend
seems to be that traditional expressive works are receiving less
protection under these state statutes than under the Lanham
80
Act. To partially resolve these inconsistencies, some have
suggested Congress give preemptive effect to the Lanham Act’s
81
dilution exceptions.
However, none of these problems give sufficient support for
Desai’s conclusion that the law needs to recognize a public
figure doctrine in the context of infringement and dilution
actions.

Law after the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, at 16 (Chicago-Kent College of
Law Honors Scholars Seminar Paper 2011), available at http://www
.kentlaw.iit.edu/Documents/Academic%20Programs/Honors%20Scholars/2011/
Patrick-Bickley-paper.pdf.
77. See LaFrance, supra note 55, at 462.
78. See id.
79. See Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994)
(concerning dilution action under New York law).
80. See LaFrance, supra note 55, at 470.
81. See id. at 463.

